The study is available on Schneier's web site:
Defeating Encrypted and Deniable File Systems: TrueCrypt v5.1a and the Case of the Tattling OS and Applications ⚠️ ↗
Note the subtitle: it's the operating system and applications that make it very hard to design deniable file systems:
As our results suggest, any DFS will not only have to encrypt and hide data — as file systems like TrueCrypt do — but must also erase any traces of that data left by the operating system through normal operation. [...]
We have not analyzed version 6.0, but observe that TrueCrypt v6.0 does take new steps to improve TrueCryptÂ’s deniability properties [...] We suggest that the breadth of our results for TrueCrypt v5.1a highlight the challenges to creating deniable file systems. Given these potential challenges, we encourage the users not to blindly trust the deniability of such systems. Rather, we encourage further research evaluating the deniability of such systems, as well as research on new yet light-weight methods for improving deniability.
We have not analyzed version 6.0, but observe that TrueCrypt v6.0 does take new steps to improve TrueCryptÂ’s deniability properties [...] We suggest that the breadth of our results for TrueCrypt v5.1a highlight the challenges to creating deniable file systems. Given these potential challenges, we encourage the users not to blindly trust the deniability of such systems. Rather, we encourage further research evaluating the deniability of such systems, as well as research on new yet light-weight methods for improving deniability.
Surf safe;)
NFiH