Re: Truecrypt

There's really nothing new there. All security experts knew that windows leaves all sorts of tracks of your activities, many years before vista ever came out. The solution to this problem has been available for a very long time too, which is to encrypt the whole os, so that any tracks left over are also inside the encrypted volumes. Don't let windows run while any unencrypted volumes are open.

For windows users, truecrypt supports "pre-boot authentication", which seems to do that very thing. I haven't used windows in years because of its insecurity, so I don't know how good this implementation is.

For linux users, just encrypt your root fs, and put the otf encryption software into your initramfs, if you understand what this means.

Schneier argued that this fact could also be used to determine whether the user had revealed all of their hidden volumes effectively getting around the second level of plausible deniability offered by TrueCrypt.

No. It could just be that those files are from an external portable drive, like a flash usb drive, or a cd. Plausible deniability is intact here.

He said implementing such a system could even be dangerous for users. "It is unsafe to use a product that has a steganographic file system, since you can never prove you have no steganographic data," Callas said.

What is this bullshit? "Officer, can you prove that you don't own a large marijuana farm in some far away land?"