This came up in the depths of a thread where I was debating with Dante, but it's important enough that it's worth a topic.

The gist of Dante's claim is that if you cannot cite hard evidence for a claim then you should not make it. In particular, if people say something and you think they mean something else, you should not suggest otherwise.

A particular case is this:

Weeks ago, I replied to "look at how many people will routinely express their beliefs on the subject by saying "children can't consent, therefore pedophilia is wrong".

With: I know that's what they say, but I think they are speaking loosely. They mean that the consent is not properly informed and a "yes" has no weight."

In response to the objection that I'm telling other people what they think, I replied just yesterday, My assertion there is not that I have the right to interpret what people mean. I am saying that if we got a hundred people who said that and explained to them the alternatives and asked them which they really meant, the large majority would interpret it the way I predict. It's an empirical assertion.

Dante's reply: Of course it isn't. Otherwise you'd have something to cite. Since you know you can't, you just have to imagine a fictional presentation of other factors, a fictional reevaluation and a fictional survey to "empirically" analyze... Cite it if its there. If not, stop claiming it of others without citation.

So, how does this sound to other people? Do you think Dante's admonition is reasonable? Think about it a bit.

think...

think...

think...

think...

If you do, then think about the standard pro-contact claim that most harm from child sexual activity is iatrogenic harm. Where does that stand?

Women (and men) claim they were harmed by past sexual activity even if they didn't object at the time, but you claim they are overwhelmingly mistaken. The claim isn't even as simple as they don't mean what they say. I think most of you would agree that if you surveyed them and presented the idea that they were actually harmed as opposed to society's having just convinced them that they were harmed when they weren't, they would say they were harmed. (If you don't agree, then the structure is exactly as in the case Dante criticized me for.)

It's not as bad as saying they didn't say what they meant, it's saying that they didn't really mean what they meant! That they (at least the vast preponderance of them) are wrong about why they believe what they believe. And what empirical study can you cite in support of that? A few anecdotal reports aren't enough. It should be very convincing indeed to warrant such a claim.

I, Ethan, claim that when someone says a child can't consent, most mean it isn't informed, valid consent. Dante claims this claim should not be made without empirical support. If so, then the entire idea that most harm is iatrogenic should vanish from discourse.

My conclusion is that Dante's standard of evidence is unreasonable. It is convenient to hold your opponent to standards of evidence far beyond what you require of yourself, but it is profoundly dishonest.

I am not saying that iatrogenic harm should vanish from discourse -- though I think these limitations should be kept soberly in mind. I am saying that speculation without hard evidence is in general justified. I claim that when most people say "children can't consent" they don't mean that children can't utter the words "yes" and "no" and mean what they say. If you still want to talk about iatrogenic harm, your claim should not be, "Don't say it if you don't have a survey to cite", it should be an argument that I'm wrong about the substance of the matter. Claim the survey would come out differently.